Miscellanies 2.17.76

Summary: Knowledge is a state unshakable by reason, ignorance a yielding impression; Clement defines the related terms: experience, cognizance, intellection, understanding, knowing, and truth.

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Greek text · Stählin 2:152–153

Ὡς οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητική ἐστιν ἕξις, ἀφʼ ἧς τὸ ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει, γίνεται δὲ ἡ κατάληψις αὐτῇ ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἄγνοια φαντασία ἐστὶν εἴκουσα, μεταπτωτικὴ ὑπὸ λόγου, τὸ δὲ μεταπῖπτον ὡς καὶ τὸ συνασκούμενον ἐκ λόγου ἐφʼ ἡμῖν. παράκειται δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἥ τʼ ἐμπειρία καὶ ἡ εἴδησις σύνεσίς τε καὶ νόησις καὶ γνῶσις. καὶ ἡ μὲν εἴδησις ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθʼ ὅλου κατʼ εἶδος εἴη ἄν· ἡ δὲ ἐμπειρία ἐπιστήμη περιληπτική, ὥστε καὶ οἷόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον πολυπραγμονεῖν· νόησις δὲ ἐπιστήμη νοητοῦ· καὶ σύνεσις ἐπιστήμη συμβλητοῦ ἢ σύμβλησις ἀμετάπτωτος ἢ συμβλητικὴ δύναμις ὧν φρόνησίς ἐστι καὶ ἐπιστήμη. καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ ἑκάστου καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰς ἕνα λόγον γνῶσις δὲ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ ἢ ἐπιστήμη σύμφωνος τοῖς γινομένοις· ἀλήθειά τε ἐπιστήμη ἀληθοῦς, ἡ δὲ ἕξις τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπιστήμη ἀληθῶν.

English · Claude translation

As, then, knowledge is a state that knows, from which knowing results, and its apprehension is unshakable by reason; so ignorance is a yielding impression, shakable by reason. And what can be shaken, like what is trained by reason, rests with us. Close to knowledge lie experience and cognizance, understanding, intellection, and knowing. Cognizance would be knowledge of universals by species; experience is comprehensive knowledge, so as to inquire into what each thing is like; intellection is knowledge of what is intelligible; understanding is knowledge of what can be compared, or unshakable comparison, or the power of comparing things of which there is prudence and knowledge, both of each one and of all that fall under one account. Knowing is knowledge of the thing itself, or knowledge in agreement with what happens; and truth is knowledge of what is true, and the state of truth is knowledge of true things.

About this passage

Source
Stählin 2:152–153 · Otto Stählin, ed., Clemens Alexandrinus, vol. 2, Stromata Buch I–VI, GCS 15 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1906); vol. 3, Stromata Buch VII und VIII, GCS 17 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909) · Greek text: Otto Stählin, Clemens Alexandrinus 2–3 (GCS 15, 17, 1906–1909), digitized by the Perseus Digital Library, CC BY-SA 4.0
Translation
Claude translation (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 · Translated by Claude from the Greek text of Stählin (1906–1909); made independently of existing English translations.
Topics
Ethics

Notes

Translation notes

  • The definitions are largely Stoic. The terms are hard to distinguish in English: εἴδησις “cognizance,” ἐμπειρία “experience,” νόησις “intellection,” σύνεσις “understanding,” γνῶσις “knowing.” The text of the definition of understanding is uncertain.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (stray period in the digital text): ἐπιστητική ἐστιν ἕξις. ἀφʼ ἧς → ἐπιστητική ἐστιν ἕξις, ἀφʼ ἧς.

Cite this passage

Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 2.17.76 (trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/clement-stromata/2/17/76/).

Plain text
Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 2.17.76 (trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/clement-stromata/2/17/76/).

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