Miscellanies 8.6.19
Summary: Division supplies the material and definition shapes it; definitions express our universal concepts, and the only sound division is that of a genus into its species.
Greek text · Stählin 2
Ὅθεν ὕλης μὲν τάξιν ἐπέχει ἡ διαίρεσις τῷ ὅρῳ, τὴν ἁπλότητα τοῦ ὀνόματος ἀναζητοῦσα, τεχνίτου δὲ καὶ δημιουργοῦ ὁ ὅρος ἐπισυντιθεὶς καὶ κατασκευάζων καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν τοῦ ὄντος παριστάς. οὔτʼ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων οὔτε τῶν ἰδεῶν οἱ ὅροι, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὧν πραγμάτων [ὧν] ἔχομεν καθολικὰς διανοίας, τούτων τῶν διανοιῶν τοὺς ἑρμηνευτικοὺς λόγους εἶναί φαμεν· τούτων γὰρ τῶν διανοιῶν καὶ αἱ διαιρέσεις γίνονται. τῶν δὲ διαιρέσεων ἣ μέν τις εἰς εἴδη διαιρεῖ τὸ διαιρούμενον ὡς γένος. ἣ δέ τις εἰς μέρη ὡς ὅλον, ἣ δὲ εἰς τὰ συμβεβηκότα. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ὅλου εἰς τὰ μέρη διαίρεσις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον κατὰ μέγεθος ἐπινοεῖται. ἡ δὲ εἰς τὰ συμβεβηκότα οὐδέποτε ὅλη δύναται διαληφθῆναι, εἴ γε καὶ οὐσίαν ἑκάστῳ δεῖ πάντως τῶν ὄντων ὑπάρχειν. ὅθεν ἀδόκιμοι ἄμφω αὗται αἱ διαιρέσεις, μόνη δὲ εὐδοκιμεῖ ἡ τοῦ γένους εἰς εἴδη τομή, ὑφʼ ἧς χαρακτηρίζεται ἥ τε ταὐτότης ἡ κατὰ γένος ἥ τε ἑτερότης ἡ κατὰ τὰς ἰδικὰς διαφοράς. τὸ εἶδος ἀεὶ ἔν τινι μέρει θεωρεῖται, οὐ μὴν ἀνάπαλιν, εἴ τι μέρος ἐστί τινος. τοῦτο καὶ εἶδος γενήσεται. ἡ γὰρ χεὶρ μέρος μέν ἐστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. εἶδος δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν. καὶ τὸ μὲν γένος ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἐνυπάρχει, τὸ γὰρ ζῷον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ βοΐ. τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει, οὐ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τοῖς ποσὶν ὑπάρχει. διὸ κυριώτερον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ μέρους. καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους κατηγορεῖται. ταῦτα πάντα καὶ τοῦ εἴδους κατηγορηθήσεται.
English · Claude translation
Hence division holds the place of matter for definition, seeking out the simplicity of the name, while definition holds the place of the craftsman and maker, putting together, constructing, and presenting the knowledge of what is. Definitions are neither of the things themselves nor of the Ideas; rather, of the things of which we have universal concepts, we say that definitions are the accounts that express these concepts; for divisions too are made of these concepts. Of divisions, one divides what is divided into species, as a genus; another into parts, as a whole; another into accidents. The division of a whole into parts is conceived for the most part in terms of magnitude; the division into accidents can never be comprehended entire, since every being must certainly have a substance. Hence both these divisions are not approved, and only the cutting of the genus into species is approved, by which both sameness in genus and difference in specific differentiae are marked. The species is always seen in some part, but not conversely: if something is a part of something, it will not therefore also be a species. For the hand is a part of the man, but it is not a species. And the genus is present in the species, for “animal” is in both man and ox; but the whole is not present in the parts, for the man is not in his feet. Therefore the species is more proper than the part. And whatever is predicated of the genus will all be predicated of the species too.
About this passage
Notes
Translation notes
- “Ideas” renders ἰδέαι, Plato's Forms. “Accidents” renders τὰ συμβεβηκότα, properties that belong to a thing without being part of its essence.
Cite this passage
Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 8.6.19 (trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/clement-stromata/8/6/19/).
Plain text
Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 8.6.19 (trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/clement-stromata/8/6/19/).
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