Miscellanies 8.9.29
Summary: A cause is always relative to an effect and to something able to receive it; therefore nothing can be its own cause, just as no one can be his own father.
Greek text · Stählin 2
Πᾶν αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον διπλῇ διανοίᾳ ληπτὸν τυγχάνει. ἐπεὶ τινὸς καὶ πρός τινι νοεῖται, τινὸς μέν, τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος, καθάπερ ἡ μάχαιρα τοῦ τέμνειν, πρός τινι δέ. [καθάπερ] τῷ ἐπιτηδείως ἔχοντι, καθάπερ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ξύλῳ· τὸν ἀδάμαντα γὰρ οὐ καύσει. τὸ αἴτιον τῶν πρός τι· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον νοεῖται σχέσιν, ὥστε δυεῖν ἐπιβάλλομεν, ἵνα τὸ αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον νοήσωμεν. Ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ περὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ ποιητοῦ λόγος καὶ πατρός. οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτό τι ἑαυτοῦ αἴτιον οὐδὲ ἑαυτοῦ τις πατήρ, ἐπεὶ τὸ πρῶτον γενήσεται δεύτερον· τό γε μὴν αἴτιον ἐνεργεῖ καὶ διατίθησι, τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου γενόμενον πάσχει καὶ διατίθεται. οὐ δύναται δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ λαμβανόμενον ἐνεργεῖν ἅμα καὶ διατίθεσθαι. οὐδὲ υἱὸς εἶναι καὶ πατήρ. καὶ ἄλλως τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ γινομένου προχρονεῖ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὡς ἡ μάχαιρα τῆς τομῆς. οὐ δύναται δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ προχρονεῖν τῇ ὕλῃ. καθὸ αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ἅμα καὶ ὑστερεῖν καὶ ὑστεροχρονεῖν, καθὸ τῆς αἰτίας ἐστὶν ἔργον. διαφέρει τε τὸ εἶναι τοῦ γίνεσθαι· οὕτως καὶ αἴτιον μὲν τοῦ γινομένου, πατὴρ δὲ υἱοῦ. οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ εἶναι ἅμα καὶ γίνεσθαι. οὐθὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἑαυτοῦ αἴτιον.
English · Claude translation
Every cause, as a cause, is to be grasped by a twofold thought, since it is understood as “of something” and “in relation to something”: of something, namely the effect, as the knife is of cutting; in relation to something, namely what is suitably disposed, as fire is in relation to wood, for it will not burn adamant. The cause is among relatives, for it is understood by its relation to something else, so that we direct our minds to two things in order to understand the cause as a cause. The same account holds of the maker, the creator, and the father. Nothing is its own cause, nor is anyone his own father, since the first would become second. The cause acts and disposes; what comes about by the cause is acted upon and disposed. The same thing, taken in relation to itself, cannot at once act and be disposed, nor be son and father. And besides, the cause precedes in time, in respect of its being, what comes about by it, as the knife precedes the cutting. The same thing cannot in the same respect both precede in time in respect of matter, insofar as it is a cause, and at the same time come after and be later in time, insofar as it is the work of the cause. Being also differs from becoming; so too the cause is cause of what comes to be, and the father is father of a son. For it is not possible for the same thing, in the same respect, both to be and to become at once. Nothing, then, is its own cause.
About this passage
Notes
Translation notes
- “Adamant” is the hardest substance known to the ancients, thought to be unburnable. The mention of “the maker, the creator, and the father” may have a theological application in view, but the passage does not draw it out. The digital text reads πρὸς ἑαυτῶ (“in relation to itself”), probably for ἑαυτό or ἑαυτῷ; the sense is clear.
Notes on the original text
- Digital text corrected (misspelling in the digital text): πρὸς ἑαυτῶ λαμβανόμενον → πρὸς ἑαυτὸ λαμβανόμενον.
Cite this passage
Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 8.9.29 (trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/clement-stromata/8/9/29/).
Plain text
Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 8.9.29 (trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/clement-stromata/8/9/29/).
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