Against Celsus 7.15
Summary: Using a Stoic form of argument, Origen shows that Celsus's hypothesis contradicts itself: true prophets could not have foretold that the supreme God himself would be enslaved, fall sick, or die.
Textual problem in this passage: the printed text is uncertain or disputed here. See the notes.
Greek text · Koetschau 2:166–167
Ἐπεὶ δʼ ἀδύνατά τινα καὶ ἀπρεπῆ θεῷ καθʼ ὑπόθεσιν τιθείς φησιν· εἰ ταῦτα προφητεύοιτο περὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεοῦ, ἆρʼ, ἐπεὶ προλέγεται, πιστεύεσθαι δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ θεοῦ; καὶ νομίζει κατασκευάζεσθαι ὅτι, κἂν ἀληθῶς ὦσι προειρηκότες οἱ προφῆται περὶ υἱοῦ θεοῦ τοιαῦτα, ἀδύνατον ἦν αὐτὸν παθεῖν ἢ δρᾶσαι χρῆναι πιστεύειν τοῖς προειρημένοις· λεκτέον ὅτι ἡ ὑπόθεσις αὐτοῦ ἄτοπος οὖσα ποιήσαι ἂν συνημμένα εἰς τὰ ἀλλήλοις ἀντικείμενα λήγοντα, ὅπερ οὕτω δείκνυται. εἰ οἱ ἀληθῶς προφῆται τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεοῦ δουλεύειν ἢ νοσεῖν ἀεὶ ἢ τεθνήξεσθαι φήσαιεν τὸν θεὸν, συμβήσεται ταῦτα περὶ τὸν θεὸν, ἀψευδεῖν γὰρ ἀνάγκη τοὺς τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ προφήτας· ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ οἱ ἀληθῶς προφῆται τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτά φασιν, ἐπεὶ τὰ τῇ φύσει ἀδύνατα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, οὐκ ἂν συμβαίη περὶ τὸν θεὸν ἃ λέγουσιν οἱ προφῆται. ὅταν δὲ δύο συνημμένα λήγῃ εἰς τὰ ἀλλήλοις ἀντικείμενα τῷ καλουμένῳ „διὰ δύο τροπικῶν“ θεωρήματι, ἀναιρεῖται τὸ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς συνημμένοις ἡγούμενον, ὅπερ ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ τὸ προλέγειν τοὺς προφήτας τὸν μέγαν θεὸν δουλεύειν ἢ νοσήσειν ἢ τεθνήξεσθαι. συνάγεται οὖν τὸ οὐκ ἄρα προεῖπον οἱ προφῆται τὸν μέγαν θεὸν δουλεύσειν ἢ νοσήσειν ἢ τεθνήξεσθαι, καὶ ὑπάγεταί γε ὁ λόγος τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ· εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον· εἰ [οὐ] τὸ πρῶτον, οὐ τὸ δεύτερον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον. φέρουσι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ὕλης τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, λέγοντες τό· εἰ ἐπίστασαι ὅτι τέθνηκας, τέθνηκας· εἰ ἐπίστασαι ὅτι τέθνηκας. οὐ τέθνηκας· ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ οὐκ ἄρα ἐπίστασαι ὅτι τέθνηκας. τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον κατασκευάζουσι τὰ συνημμένα· εἰ ἐπίστασαι ὅτι τέθνηκας, ἔστιν ὃ ἐπίστασαι, ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ τέθνηκας. καὶ πάλιν· εἰ ἐπίστασαι ὅτι οὐ τέθνηκας, καὶ ἔστιν ὃ ἐπίστασαι, οὐ τέθνηκας, ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ τεθνηκὼς (οὐδὲν) ἐπίσταται, δῆλον ὅτι, εἰ ἐπίστασαι ὅτι τέθνηκας, οὐ τέθνηκας. καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ, ὡς προεῖπον, ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς συνημμένοις τὸ οὐκ ἄρα ἐπίστασαι ὅτι τέθνηκας. τοιοῦτόν τι ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τὴν Κέλσου ὑπόθεσιν, λέγοντος ἣν προεξεθέμεθα λέξιν.
English · Claude translation
Since, positing hypothetically things impossible and unfitting for God, he says, If these things were prophesied about the God over all, must such things be believed about God because they are foretold?, and thinks he establishes that, even if the prophets had truly foretold such things about the Son of God, it would be impossible to believe the predictions that he would suffer or do them, it must be said that his hypothesis, being absurd, would produce conditionals ending in contradictory conclusions. This is shown as follows. If the true prophets of the God over all were to say that God would be a slave, or be sick, or die, these things will happen to God, for the prophets of the great God must speak truly. But also, if the true prophets of the God over all say these same things, since what is impossible by nature is not true, what the prophets say would not happen to God. And when two conditionals end in contradictory conclusions, by the theorem called “through two conditionals,” the antecedent common to both conditionals is refuted; here it is that the prophets foretell that the great God will be a slave or be sick or die. The conclusion, then, is that the prophets did not foretell that the great God would be a slave or be sick or die. The argument runs in this form: If the first, then the second; if the first, then not the second; therefore not the first. The Stoics also apply this form to a concrete case, saying: If you know that you are dead, you are dead; if you know that you are dead, you are not dead; it follows that you do not know that you are dead. They establish the conditionals in this way: If you know that you are dead, what you know is so; therefore it is so that you are dead. And again: if you know that you are dead, then, since there is something you know, you are not dead; for a dead man knows nothing. So it is plain that if you know that you are dead, you are not dead. And from both conditionals follows, as I said, the conclusion that you do not know that you are dead. Something of this sort holds for Celsus's hypothesis, stated in the words we quoted above.
About this passage
Notes
Translation notes
- The Stoic argument “through two conditionals” runs: if p then q; if p then not-q; therefore not-p. In the schema the editor deletes a “not” (“if [not] the first”), so it is not translated. In the Stoic example the text of the second conditional’s proof reads “if you know that you are not dead,” where the argument requires “that you are dead”; the translation follows the argument. “Nothing” in “a dead man knows nothing” is an editorial supplement.
Cite this passage
Origen, Cels. 7.15 (trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/origen-celsum/7/15/).
Plain text
Origen, Cels. 7.15 (trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/origen-celsum/7/15/).
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